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FEDERAL CouRTS--JURY SELECTION-EXCLUSION OF WAGE EARNERS-

In an action Mr personal injuries, r.emoved to a federal court, petitioner, a
salesman, demanded a jury trial. He moved to strike out the entire panel,
alleging that "mostly business executives or those having the employer's viewpoint are purposely selected on said panel .•. [thus] discriminating against
0th.er occupations and classes." 1 The evidence showed that the clerk of the
court and the jury commissioner had as a matter of practice excluded from the
jury list all persons working for a daily wage. They gave as their reason the
fact that such persons, called for jury service, invariably requested to be excused
on grounds of financial hardship, and the judge invariably excused them. 2 The
clerk's testimony concluded, "and so in order to avoid putting names of people in
who I know won't become jurors in the court ••. I do.leave them out." 3 After
a heari~g, at which testimony was taken, the motion was denied. A jury of
twelve was chosen; petitioner chall.enged these jurors, on the same grounds and
the challenge was denied. The trial resulted in a verdict for the respondent.
Petitioner moved for a new trial, on the same grounds. The court, in denying
this motion found that five of the- jurors actually serving "belong more closely
and intimately with. the working man and the employee class than they do with
any other class"; 4 judgment was entered for respondent, which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals a:ffirmed. 5 On certiorari to,the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, reversed •. Prospective jurors must be selected without sys-

Principal case at 98 5.
Id. at 986.
8 Ibid.
4 Id. at 985.
5 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company, (C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 783.
1

2
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tematic exclusion of economic or other classes; failure to comply with this requirement is ground for reversal by the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power
of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts. 6 Thiel 'lJ.
Southern Pacific Company, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 984.
A litigant is not entitled to have any specific class of persons represented on
a jury.7 Over objection, it has been held not ground for reversal that there were
absent from the jury negroes, 8 Masons,9 Socialists,1° women, 11 and numbers
game players. 12 There are cases to the effect that rejection for a jury list of
qualified persons is not ground for reversal, if there is no claim that the jury as
finally constituted was not impartial.13 These cases fall into two classes; cases
in the early nineteenth century, arising out of a comparatively homogeneous
social pattern, and cases where such classes as doctors, lawyers, ministers, etc.,
were excluded from jury lists for reasons of public policy.14 It is well settled that
a litigant is _entitled to a jury chosen without discrimination on account of race,1 5
either by statute or by administrative practice. Though there are no cases actually holding that such discrimination as was practised in the principal case is
°Fora discussion of the general power of such supervision, see McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1942).
7
35 C.J. 143, Juries, § 9: " ••• A party has no right to insist that persons of his
particular race, sex, religious faith, or political party, or speaking his own tongue, or who
are acquainted with him, shall be upon the jury." See notes 7, 8, 9, 10, I 1, infra.
8
Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658, 26 A. (2d) 815 (1942); United States ex rel.
Jackson v. Brady, (D.C. Md. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 362; State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14
S. (2d) 873 (1943); Watkins v. State, (Ga. 1945) 33 S.E. (2d) 325; Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1897); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 26 S.Ct. 338 (1906).
9
People v. Jewett, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 314 (1829).
10
Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 38 S.Ct. 168 (1917).
1.1 United States v. Ballard, (D.C. Cal. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 105.
12
Shettel v. United States, (App. D.C. 1940) II3 F. (2d) 34.
13
Ibid; People v. Jewett, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 314 (1829); Rawlins v. Georgia,
201 U.S. 638, 26 S.Ct. 560 (1906). This case involved exclusion of lawyers, doctors,
ministers, locomotive engineers and firemen from the jury list, on the ground that
they would probably have been excused. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment,
and added, per Holmes, J.: "Even when persons liable to jury under the state laws
are excluded, it is no ground for challenge to the array, if a sufficient number of unexceptionable persons are present." Id. at 640.
14
For a general discussion of the objectives and methods of jury selection, see
Blume, "Jury Selection Analyzed: Proposed Revision of Federal System," 42 MxcH.
L. REv. 831 (1944); Report to the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges of
the United States of the Committee on Selection of Jurors (1942); Knox, "Selecting
Jurors for Service in the District Courts of the United States," 21 D1cTA 283 (1944).
15
28 U.S.C. (1940) §415. Otherwise, per 28 U.S.C. (1940) §411, the qualifications of jurors in federal district courts are determined by the provisions of the
highest state court of the state in which the court is located. On discrimination on
account of race, see Strauder•V. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 20 S.Ct. 687 (1900); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226,
24 S.Ct. 257 (1904); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935);
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 58 S.Ct. 753 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 3II U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164 (1940).
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ground for reversal, the result here reached has been foreshadowed by vigorous
statements in some of the negro-exclusion cases, notably in an opinion by Black,
· . J., in Pierre v. Louisiana,16 and certainly the purposes of the jury system require
this conclusion on principle. Frankfurter, J., dissenting, points out that in the
instant case petitioner did not claim that the jury as actually chosen was anything
but fair, that in fact half the jury was composed of members of the working class,
that if not excluded en masse the wage-earners in question would doubtless have
been excused individually, and that any intent on the part of the·court officials
to discriminate unfairly is negatived by the fact that the jury list included names
of wives of wage-earners; and he argues that "American society is happily not so
fragmentized that those who get paid oy the day adopt a different social outlook,
have a different sense of justice, and a different conception of a juror's responsibility than their fellow workers paid by the week." 17 Though the cogency of
the dissenting arguments as applied to the facts of the principal case make the
result of the decision seem unnecessarily doctrinaire, it is felt that the concern of
the majority for principle, expressed by Murphy, J., is the part of wisdom; it is
felt also that the present holding is lik.ely to be followed.
John R. Dykema

16 Note 14, supra. "Indictment by Grand Jury and trial by jury cease to harmonize with our traditional concepts of justice at the very moment particular groups,
classes, or races--otherwise qualified to serve as jurors in a community-are excluded as
such from jury service." 306 U.S. 354 at 358.
17 66 S.Ct. 984 at 990.

